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AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO
EXTRATERRITORIALLY APPREHEND AND LAWFULLY
PROSECUTE INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKERS
AND OTHER FUGITIVES
INTRODUCTION
An "extraterritorial arrest" is the abduction of a fugitive wanted
by the United States, performed by the United States or its agents,
within the borders of a foreign country.' The concept of conducting
an extraterritorial arrest without the consent of the foreign country
is controversial because it involves a non-consensual intrusion on a
foreign country's sovereignty.
Recently, President Bush has expressed an interest in the extra-
territorial arrest as a tool to be used in his administration's war on
drugs.2 On June 21, 1989, assistant Attorney General William Barr
issued a legal opinion entitled Authority of the FBI to Override
Customary or Other International Law in the Course of Extrater-
ritorial Law Enforcement Activities.' The content of the Barr opin-
ion is being withheld from the public on the grounds that the State
Department and the President enjoy an attorney-client privilege re-
garding their private consultations.4 While this recent opinion is as
yet unpublished, its title suggests that the Bush administration sup-
ports the non-consensual extraterritorial arrest as a tool to appre-
hend international drug traffickers wanted by the United States.
This issue was previously addressed by the State Department in
the late 1970s when a Wall Street financier, wanted by the FBI,
fled to the Bahamas.5 The fugitive financier used a portion of the
200 million dollars he fleeced from his mutual-fund's investors to
entice the Bahamian government into foregoing the usual and cus-
tomary extradition proceedings.6 The illicit payoff successfully
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 528 (6th ed. 1989) (extraterritoriality).
2. L.A. Times, Oct. 13, 1989, at 1, col. 7; San Diego Tribune, Oct. 13, 1989, at 1, col.
5.
3. L.A. Times, Oct. 14, 1989, at 1, col. 7.
4. Telephone interview with the office of the Attorney General (Oct. 18, 1989).
5. L.A. Times, Oct. 13, 1989, at 1, col. 7.
6. Extradition is the surrender of a criminal by a foreign state to which the criminal
has fled for refuge from prosecution. Surrender is made to the state within whose jurisdiction
the crime was committed, upon the demand of the latter state, in order that the fugitive
1
Pontoni: Authority of the United States to Extraterritorially Apprehend an
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1990
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
stymied the FBI's efforts to bring the financier to justice in the
United States.
After this incident, the Carter administration ordered that a
memorandum be issued by John Harmon, head of the Office of Le-
gal Counsel, addressing the legal implications of executing an ex-
traterritorial arrest of the fugitive.7 This arrest was to be made
without the consent of the Bahamian government, and in violation
of its sovereignty. The opinion, published on March 30, 1980,
plainly advised that the FBI must respect "customary international
law" by stating that "U.S. agents have no law-enforcement author-
ity in another nation unless it is the product of the other nation's
consent."" As a result, the Carter administration did not authorize
the extraterritorial arrest of the financier.
President Bush's interest in the viability of the extraterritorial
arrest was surely heightened by the April 1990 announcement by
President Virgilio Barco to halt extradition of Medellin drug cartel
leaders such as Pablo Escobar. Barco's decision came one day after
twelve Colombian police officers were murdered, another eight were
wounded, and a Colombian senator was kidnapped by cartel assas-
sins.9 In the seven months prior to this assault, the Barco govern-
ment had extradited fifteen drug trafficking suspects to the United
States.10
The new non-extradition policy of the Colombians raises serious
doubt as to whether these fugitives will ever be brought to justice.
Without the express permission of the country where the fugitive is
located, apprehension of the fugitive outside the extradition process
by the United States would raise serious questions of customary
international law. In fact, the United States has not prosecuted an
extraterritorially apprehended fugitive after a formal protest has
been lodged by the foreign country for nearly 55 years."
might be dealt with according to its laws. Extradition may be granted as a matter of comity,
or may take place under treaty stipulations between the two nations. Terlinden v. Ames, 184
U.S. 270, 289 (1901).
7. L.A. Times, Oct. 13, 1989, at 1, col. 7; San Diego Tribune, Oct. 13, 1989, at 1,
col. 5.
8. 4 Op. Off. Legal Couns. 543, 547 (1980). A customary international law is the
manifestation of an international custom which accepts a general practice among nations as
the law. International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b).
9. San Diego Tribune, Apr. 4, 1990, at 1, col. 5.
10. Id.
11. Ex parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Tex. 1934). See also United States v. Caro-
Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 C.D. Cal. (1990) (holding that when the United States violates
an extradition treaty between the U.S. and Mexico by unilaterally abducting the defendant
from his homeland, and when Mexican authorities subsequently file an objection, then the
district court lacks personal jurisdiction to try the defendant).
[Vol. 21
2
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 1 [1990], Art. 11
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol21/iss1/11
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL ARREST
Both the 1980 and the 1989 opinions were written by the United
States Office of Legal Counsel, and they are separated only by the
passing of the presidency from the Carter administration to the
Reagan/Bush administration. The apparently contrary conclusions
of law presented in the two opinions suggest that issues raised by
the prospect of the non-consensual extraterritorial arrest are unset-
tled. Herein lies the reason for this Comment. This Comment ana-
lyzes the two key issues that underlie the non-consensual extraterri-
torial arrest controversy. The first is whether a fugitive who is
abducted by the FBI inside a foreign country's borders without the
consent of that country may be successfully prosecuted in the
United States, regardless of the clear violation of that country's
sovereignty. The second question is how to remedy the violation of
the foreign country's sovereignty. This Comment concludes that the
United States can lawfully prosecute such a fugitive, and proposes
two potential remedies for the sovereignty infringement.
First, this Comment reviews the opinion published by the State
Department in 1980. Second, the scope of the FBI's jurisdiction
regarding international criminal activity is examined. Third, the
constitutional rights of the extraterritorially apprehended individual
are evaluated. Fourth, the effects that a treaty and customary inter-
national law can have on the prosecution of fugitives apprehended
via an extraterritorial arrest are assessed. Within this discussion,
this Comment exposes the broad powers possessed by the United
States, as a self-determined sovereign, to conduct itself as it chooses
in both domestic and international matters. Finally, proposals are
included for both a political solution and an international legal so-
lution to the violation of sovereignty issue.
I. THE 1980 OPINION PUBLISHED BY THE OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL
The 1980 opinion addresses the question of when does the FBI,
as a matter of United States law, have the authority to make an
extraterritorial arrest.'2 The opinion addresses several key sub-is-
sues in determining that the FBI has lawful authority to make an
extraterritorial arrest only when the state in which the fugitive is
abducted consents to the proposed apprehension.13
The first sub-issue addresses the effect of the arrest on the court's
12. 4 Op. Off. Legal Couns. 543 (1980).
13. Id. at 547.
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ability to prosecute the alleged criminals.14 The opinion states that
"in the absence of an international law violation, a federal district
court will not ordinarily divest itself of jurisdiction in a criminal
case."18 However, the opinion reserved judgment on whether an in-
ternational law violation should result in the relinquishment of
criminal jurisdiction over the person abducted.' 6
Secondly, the opinion states that a non-consensual extraterrito-
rial arrest may have implications of civil liability for the arresting
agents if the FBI is not authorized to conduct the operation under
international law.' 7 The three theories of civil liability set forth are
constitutional violations by international agents, false imprison-
ment, and violations of international law.' 8 The opinion notes that
FBI agents may enjoy an absolute or qualified immunity if sued for
damages.' 9 The opinion cites Norton v. United States,2" which
holds that an FBI agent enjoys qualified immunity when his actions
are within the outer limits of the FBI's authority and the arrest is
conducted in good faith. The opinion concludes that the Norton test
is satisfied only when the arrest has the acquiescence of the country
in which the fugitive is captured.2'
The opinion then addresses the potential for criminal kidnapping
charges for the FBI agents who carry out the arrests.22 The opinion
states that a foreign country's charge of kidnapping, accompanied
by its demand for extradition of the FBI agent, would be a point of
diplomatic embarrassment to the United States because of the lack
of a prior agreement authorizing the FBI action.23 Ultimately, the
opinion advises that an extraterritorial arrest should not be author-
ized without the foreign country's consent, because of this potential
for embarrassment.24
The 1980 opinion's recommendation that the United States
should not conduct non-consensual extraterritorial arrests is set
forth with only measured certainty and without absolute convic-
tion.25 Accordingly, the door is not closed to another exploration or
14. Id. at 543.
15. Id. at 545.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 546.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 546-47
20. Norton v. United States, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1978).
21. 4 Op. Off. Legal Couns. 543, 547 (1980).
22. Id. at 549.
23. Id. at 550.
24. Id.
25. For instance, the opinion states that an extraterritorial arrest is "an impermissible
(Vol. 21
4
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 1 [1990], Art. 11
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol21/iss1/11
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL ARREST
interpretation of the legality of a non-consensual extraterritorial ar-
rest. Hence, a fresh analysis of the issue is set forth below.
II. AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO APPREHEND AND
LAWFULLY PROSECUTE INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKERS AND
OTHER FUGITIVES BY EMPLOYING THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
ARREST
The Constitution, as well as the executive, legislative, and judi-
cial branches of the United States government, all provide for limi-
tations on the authority under which federal agencies such as the
FBI may act. Each branch of government exercises dominion over
the many different steps involved when a fugitive operating on an
international scale is brought to justice in the United States. This
process includes the apprehension of the fugitive and his subsequent
transport to the U.S., compliance with international customary laws
and treaties, protecting the fugitive's civil rights, and determining if
the judiciary has jurisdiction over the matter. These procedures are
studied in detail below.
A. The Non-Consensual Extraterritorial Arrest
The jurisdiction of a nation within its own boundaries is exclusive
and absolute.2" It is not susceptible to any limitation that is not
self-imposed.27 Consequently, all exceptions to the complete and
full power of a nation within its territories must be traced to the
consent of the nation itself.28 Therefore, only the government's do-
mestic laws, and the international agreements to which the govern-
ment is a signatory, can circumscribe a sovereign's power to law-
invasion of the territorial integrity of another state" and cites only the dicta in United States
ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), a case upholding an extraterritorial
arrest. 4 Op. Off. Legal Couns. 543, 546 (1980). The opinion only speculates in stating that
"[the best assumption for the purpose of analyzing the implications of the [non-consensual
extraterritorial arrest] is that . . . it would violate international law," and "[tihe Second
Circuit ... has explicitly declined to define the implications of an international law violation
on criminal jurisdiction." Id.
Furthermore, when meritoriously- discussing the potential civil and criminal implications
for the FBI agents as abductors, the conclusions drawn were ambiguous. Examples include,
"the action would probably depend upon the moral aspects of the case which we cannot here
consider," and "we ... recommend that any [FBI operations] strictly adhere to local law
and function with . . . at least tacit approval of the country involved." Id. at 546, 550. Both
statements were made in spite of the fact, cited in the same opinion, that the FBI is not
geographically restricted when detecting and prosecuting crimes, no matter where the action
is undertaken. Id. at 548. See 28 U.S.C. § 533 (1989).
26. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135 (1812).
27. Id.
28. Id.
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fully prosecute a fugitive abducted by extraterritorial arrest.29
The U.S. courts determine the weight to be given a foreign sover-
eign's formal protest of the abduction of a fugitive within that sov-
ereign's borders. They do so by deciding whether the United States,
as a self-directed and sovereign country, has imposed any jurisdic-
tional limitations upon itself with regard to an arrest within the
foreign country's boundaries."0 In such matters, the general rule is
that a court of the United States will decide cases before it by
choosing the rules appropriate for the decision among the various
sources of law."1 These sources of law include domestic law, the
United States Constitution, treaties, and customary international
law.3 2 These sources are addressed in detail below.
1. Congressional Authority for the FBI to Perform the Extrater-
ritorial Arrest. This section explores whether the FBI has jurisdic-
tion to apprehend fugitives within a foreign country. A federal
agency may only carry out such acts as are authorized and in-
tended by Congress. Hence, the crux of this issue is whether it was
the intent of Congress that the FBI have authority to apprehend
fugitives in foreign countries.
The Congress has authorized the FBI to conduct investigations
regarding official matters under the authority of the Department of
Justice and the Department of State, as may be directed by the
Attorney General.3 3 Pursuant to Title 28 of the United States
Code, the FBI is commissioned to "detect and prosecute crimes
against the United States."3 4 This statute is without express or im-
plied geographical restrictions or limitations. However, considera-
tions of courtesy and mutuality require courts to construe domestic
legislation in a way that minimizes interference with the purpose
and effect of foreign law, absent an expression of congressional in-
tent to the contrary.3 5 Hence the question, "when and where may
the FBI act in international matters?" The following cases support
the conclusion that the FBI's authority to conduct international ar-
rests depends upon the matter it is investigating.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 764 (1972).
32. Id.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 533(3) (1989).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 533(1) (1989).
35. See Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 576-78 (1952); Murray v. The Schooner Charm-
ing Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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In Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Nahas,36 the
defendant challenged the federal court's jurisdiction to enforce an
investigative subpoena served by a federal agency, the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission, on a foreign citizen in a foreign land.
The defendant was wanted for allegedly fraudulent acts that oc-
curred within the United States. The subpoena, served pursuant to
7 U.S.C. section 15,a7 required the defendant to appear and pro-
duce documents in Washington D.C. When Nahas did not comply,
the district court found him in contempt of court, and froze his
assets in the United States."8 The court of appeals stated that "an
important canon of statutory construction teaches 'that legislation
of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.' -31 The
court stated that 7 U.S.C. section 15 does not expressly empower
the Commission to serve subpoenas on foreign nationals in foreign
countries.4" Moreover, the court reasoned, the legislative history
does not indicate that Congress intended to clothe the Commission
with the power to serve and investigate subpoenas extraterritori-
ally. 4 ' Furthermore, the act constituted an exercise of one sovereign
within another and that, absent the consent of the foreign nation, is
a violation of international law. 42 The court stated that:
[b]ecause an act of Congress ought never to be construed to vio-
late the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains,
...we are unwilling to infer enforcement jurisdiction absent a
clearer indication of congressional intent. We emphasize that this
case does not pose a question about the authority of Congress;
rather, it poses a question about the congressional intent embod-
ied in 7 U.S.C. section 15. Federal courts must give effect to a
valid, unambiguous congressional mandate, even if such effect
would conflict with another nation's laws or violate international
laws.4
The court held that a valid, unambiguous mandate was lacking in 7
U.S.C. section 15 and vacated the lower court's order for contempt
36. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487.
37. 7 U.S.C. § 15 (1989) sets forth in pertinent part that for the purposes of enforcing
the provisions of Title 7, the Agriculture Act, witnesses may be subpoenaed when the Com-
mission deems it relevant to their inquiry.
38. Nahas, 738 F.2d at 489.
39. Id. at 493; see also Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1948).
40. Nahas, 738 F.2d at 493.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 497.
43. Id. at 495 (quoting FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636
F.2d 1300, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
1990]
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and released the defendant's assets.44
Congress may assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, as long as such
jurisdiction does not abridge constitutional provisions or this na-
tion's international agreements. In United States v. Wright-
Barker,4" the United States Coast Guard boarded a Panamanian
freighter in international waters approximately 200 miles east of
the New Jersey coast. The crew of the freighter were citizens of
countries other than the United States. A search of the vessel un-
covered twenty-three tons of marijuana, and the defendants were
arrested and charged with, among other things, possession of a con-
trolled substance with the intent to distribute."' The issue in the
case was whether the United States courts had jurisdiction to en-
force the federal narcotics laws extraterritorially.
The court stated that one "hurdle is the traditional requirement
of international law that a state apply criminal jurisdiction to acts
committed outside its territorial borders only where an effect occurs
within those borders."47 The court cleared this hurdle by determin-
ing that the importation and distribution of twenty-three tons of
marijuana would clearly have a harmful effect in the United States;
and thus the situation justified federal law enforcement.
The court, relying upon United States v. Bowman,"4 stated that
the nature of the defendant's offense inferred extraterritorial juris-
diction because to limit the locus of his crime to a strictly territorial
jurisdiction would greatly curtail the law's usefulness. The court's
reasoning focused on the criminal's ability to commit the crime
with a like degree of effort either at home, on the high seas, or in a
foreign country. Bowman sets forth in pertinent part:
If punishment [for crimes such as robbery or arson] is to be ex-
tended to include those committed outside of the strict territorial
jurisdiction, it is natural for Congress to say so in the statute, and
failure to do so will negative the purpose of Congress in this re-
gard. . . .But the same rule of interpretation should not be ap-
plied to criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically de-
pendent on their locality for the Government's jurisdiction, but
are enacted because of the right of the government to defend it-
self against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially
44. Nahas, 738 F.2d at 496.
45. United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1986).
46. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1989).
47. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d at 167 (quoting Stassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285
(1911)).
48. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
[Vol. 21
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if committed by its own citizens, officers, or agents. . . . [Some
offenses] are such that to limit their locus to the strictly territo-
rial jurisdiction would be to greatly curtail the scope and useful-
ness of the statute .... In such cases, Congress has not thought it
necessary to make specific provision in the law that the locus shall
include the high seas and foreign countries, but allows it to be
inferred from the nature of the offense. 49
The Wright-Barker court then stated that federal statutes forbid-
ding possession of a controlled substance with the intent to dis-
tribute or import the substance were "intended [by Congress] to
have extraterritorial application. ... 50 The court held that Con-
gress' intent to apply the enumerated statutes extraterritorially was
reasonable, and affirmed the defendant's conviction. 5'
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that the FBI's investigative au-
thority lawfully extends into foreign countries while investigating
activities having an effect inside the U.S.52 Additionally, the Fifth
Circuit held that an FBI agent is authorized to investigate an inci-
dent outside United States boundaries and take the suspect into
custody both under the FBI's general power to arrest and under
international principles of jurisdiction.53
In conclusion, the FBI may have jurisdiction to perform extrater-
ritorial arrests under the direction of the Attorney General, as au-
thorized by Congress, only when the following elements are in
place: First, the assertion of jurisdiction cannot abridge the provi-
sions of the U.S. Constitution; second, the jurisdiction does not
abridge a binding treaty to which the United States is a party;
third, the fugitive's alleged crime must have a past, present, or fu-
ture impact inside the territory of the United States (the territorial
impact test); and fourth, there is a clear congressional mandate
that the statute be enforced internationally, or the crime is of a
nature that it can be committed with similar ease in either a for-
eign country, on the high seas, or at home (the congressional man-
date test). As expressed in Wright-Barker, the crimes that are cen-
tral to President Bush's war on drugs probably satisfy the
49. Id. at 98.
50. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d at 168. Specifically, the statutes cited were 21 U.S.C. §§
952(a), 960(a)(1), 955a(d)(l), 960(a)(2), 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(6).
51. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d at 168.
52. Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272, 276 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863
(1983)(FBI gathered information oversees in investigating an attorney active in various Arab
organizations).
53. In re Chan Kam-shu, 477 F.2d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988).
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territorial impact and congressional mandate tests above. The im-
portation of illegal narcotics has negatively impacted the United
States. Moreover, the crime, by nature, is routinely carried out in
foreign countries and on the high seas. Thus, the first two elements,
the constitutional rights of the fugitive and the international ramifi-
cations of the extraterritorial arrest, are explored in sections two
and three, below.
2. The Extraterritorial Arrest and the Constitution. Honoring
the civil rights of the fugitive is the central issue involved in per-
forming an extraterritorial arrest within the strictures of the U.S.
Constitution. This issue encompasses the extraterritorial fugitive's
right to procedural due process, equal protection, and to be secure
from unreasonable searches and seizures.
An FBI abduction of an international fugitive in a foreign coun-
try necessarily involves taking the fugitive into custody, thereby de-
priving the fugitive of his liberty and freedom. The Bill of Rights of
the U.S. Constitution sets forth limits upon the authority of the
government to infringe upon a person's individual rights to freedom
and liberty .5  These constitutional limitations bind the government
even when it takes actions that affect citizens outside the country's
territory. 55
The Constitution requires that the government shall not deprive
any person of liberty "without due process of law."156 Due process is
rendered when the accused is regularly indicted by a grand jury,
has a fair trial, and is not deprived of rights he is lawfully entitled
to at trial.5 7 When applied to incidents involving an extraterritorial
arrest, this well-settled rule of constitutional law is commonly re-
ferred to as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.5
Today, the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Circuit
Courts have held that due process is satisfied in matters of extrater-
ritorial arrest when a person is apprised of the charges against him
and is given a fair trial. 59 In many cases, the fugitive's right to due
54. See U.S. CONST. amends. I - X.
55. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957); Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d
1565 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
57. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522
(1951).
58. The hyphenation Ker-Frisbie is derived from the two watershed cases in this area,
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1951).
59. United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1975); Brown v.
Fogel, 387 F.2d 692, 696 n.7 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859, 860
10
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process is not even affected when seemingly inappropriate methods
of apprehension are used to bring the defendant under the jurisdic-
tion of a United States court.6 0 For example, the Eleventh Circuit
held that even though a person was captured at gunpoint in Hondu-
ras by an American agent, put on a plane against his will, and
flown to Miami, such procurement does not deprive the court of
personal jurisdiction over him.6' Similarly, the Fifth Circuit or-
dered the prosecution of a defendant even though federal agents
tricked him into believing he was taking a plane trip from Libya to
the Dominican Republic, when in fact he boarded a commercial
airline bound for -the United States.62 Thus, a defendant cannot
categorically say he is denied due process of law because he has
been brought to the court's jurisdiction by means of a forcible or
unscrupulous extraterritorial abduction.6"
However, courts have found that due process of law is not com-
pletely heedless of the means by which a fugitive is obtained. 64 In
United States v. Toscanino, the Second Circuit limited the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine and stated that a court must now "divest itself of
jurisdiction over the person . . . where it has been acquired as a
result of the government's deliberate, unnecessary and unreasona-
ble invasion of the accused's constitutional rights."'6 5 The court
stated that "[m]ethods too close to the rack and screw" that "of-
(5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Vicars, 467 F.2d 452, 456 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 967 (1973);
United States ex rel. Calhoun v. Twomey, 454 F.2d 326, 328 (7th Cir. 1971); Sewell v.
United States, 406 F.2d 1289, 1292 n.2 (8th Cir. 1969); Tynan v. Eyman, 371 F.2d 764, 766
(9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 954; United States v. Sherwood, 435 F.2d 867 (10th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971).
60. Autry v. Wiley, 440 F.2d 799, 801 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Postal, 589
F.2d 862, 869 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1257 (5th Cir.
1978) (questionable abduction on the high seas outside of territorial waters); United States
v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1073-74 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d
1508, 1531-32 (11th Cir. 1984).
61. Darby, 744 F.2d at 1531 (apprehension of a drug smuggler with acquiescence of
the Honduran government).
62. United States v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 1984) (no reference to Lib-
yan complicity with the apprehension; however, the arrest was apparently made after the
plane the defendant was flying on, accompanied by the undercover agents, had left Libya);
see also United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 901-02 (2d Cir. 1981) (bail-jumper abducted
in Bimini).
63. Wilson, 732 F.2d at 410.
64. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); United States v. Yunis, 681 F.
Supp. 909, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir.
1975); United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 1981).
65. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974); see United States v.
Romano, 706 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1983) (drug transaction initiated by an American informant
and involving Italian defendant, where the government supplied the drugs, was not outra-
geous conduct).
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fend a sense of justice" cannot be used to bring about convictions. "
To assist in the eradication of "torture, brutality, or similar outra-
geous conduct" by the federal agents, a court must divest itself of
jurisdiction over a person arrested in this fashion because such acts
are violative of the person's constitutional rights to due process and
equal protection.17 This broader interpretation of due process bars
the government from realizing the fruits of its unnecessary lawless-
ness when apprehending fugitives, and is applicable to instances of
extraterritorial arrest.6 8
Another relevant constitutional consideration is whether the ex-
traterritorial arrest is an unreasonable seizure of the fugitive's per-
son, in violation of the fourth amendment of the Constitution.69 A
violation of the fugitive's fourth amendment rights may constitute a
basis for the dismissal of the indictment, even though the fugitive is
outside the boundaries of the United States. 70
Once any fugitive is subjected to criminal prosecution, he is enti-
tled to the protection of the fourth amendment. 71 It is well settled
that the seizure of a person for whom there is a valid and proper
warrant outstanding is both authorized and reasonable within the
modern interpretations of the fourth amendment. 72  Thus, the
seizure of the fugitive is not violative of his constitutional rights
when there is a valid and outstanding warrant for his arrest.73
66. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 267 (kidnapped in Uruguay by U.S. agents, Toscanino's
nourishment was provided intravenously in precise life-preserving increments, his captors
pinched his fingers with pliers, flushed his eyes and nose with alcohol, administered jarring
bolts of electricity to his genitals, and utilized the Chinese hall-walking torture, etc., with
intermittent participation by a member of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (without a warrant, defendant's bedroom was
forcibly entered by police. He was than assaulted and hand-cuffed, and subsequently had a
vomit-causing solution forced down a tube in his nose, in order to obtain two capsules which
were swallowed in an officer's presence); United States v. Russell 411 U.S. 423, 431-32
(1972) ("[w]e may someday be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law en-
forcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the gov-
ernment from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction. ); see also Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
67. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961); Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 271.
68. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 272; Russell, 411 U.S. at 430.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
70. Cadena, 585 F.2d at 1261. But see United States v. Verdugo-Uriquidez, 110 S. Ct.
1056, 1059 (1990), where the Court held that the fourth amendment does not apply to
search and seizure by United States agents of property that is owned by a nonresident alien
located in a foreign country.
71. Reid, 354 U.S. at 1; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); United
States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1975).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1962);
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1974). But see Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1059, and
supra note 70.
73. For the sake of brevity, the collateral matter of when an arrest is valid without a
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In conclusion, a properly performed extraterritorial arrest will
not violate the fugitive's constitutional rights to due process, equal
protection, and protection from unlawful search and seizure. To be
properly performed, the abduction must be conducted in a humane
manner, exclusive of violent harm to the fugitive's person, and there
should be a valid warrant for the fugitive's arrest.
3. A Treaty's Effect on the Jurisdiction of the United States.
The constitutional requirements having been fulfilled, the following
is a discussion concerning the effects that a treaty may have on a
domestic court's jurisdiction. The United States Constitution de-
clares that treaties made under the authority of the United States
shall be the supreme law of the land."' The President has the power
to make treaties, provided two-thirds approval by the Senate." A
treaty is on the same footing and is equally binding as an act of
legislation.7" The treaty acts as a contract between the signatories
with regard to the specific matters addressed in the body of the
agreement." If a treaty and a federal statute are inconsistent, the
last in date will control. 78 In such situations, Congress need not jus-
tify legislation that modifies the treaty, and such modification is not
a matter for judicial attention.7 9 Consequently, such a treaty may
void jurisdiction over a fugitive apprehended via an extraterritorial
arrest if the treaty were given the effect of law.80
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of a binding treaty limit-
ing the court's jurisdiction in Cook v. United States."1 In Cook, the
United States Coast Guard seized a British ship which was eleven
and one-half miles from the U.S. coastline. The Tariff Act of 1922
authorized the search of all vessels within twelve miles of the
coast.8 The defendants were arrested and indicted for smuggling
liquor because the ship's log did not register the liquor as cargo.
warrant will not be discussed here. For the purposes of arresting known international drug
traffickers, it will be assumed that a valid arrest warrant has been issued and there is proba-
ble cause of a crime having been committed.
74. U.S. Co NsT. art. VI.
75. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
76. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1887); Blanco v. United States, 775
F.2d 53, 61 (2d Cir. 1985); Cal-Fruit Suma Int'l v. United States Dep't of Agric. 698 F.
Supp. 80, 83 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
77. Whitney, 124 U.S. at 77; U.S. CONST. art. VI.
78. Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194.
79. Id.
80. Id.; Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 311 (1829); Postal, 589 F.2d at 875.
81. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1932).
82. Id.
1990]
13
Pontoni: Authority of the United States to Extraterritorially Apprehend an
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1990
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
The defendants argued that a 1924 treaty that both Britain and the
United States had signed proscribed the Coast Guard's boarding of
British ships beyond ten miles of the U.S. coast. Therefore, it was
argued, the search and subsequent arrests were unauthorized be-
cause the 1924 treaty modified the 1922 Act, and thus the case
should be dismissed.
The Court held that the 1924 Treaty, being later in date than the
Act of 1922, superseded any inconsistencies between the two bodies
of law.8 3 The court then dismissed the case, holding that "the gov-
ernment lacked the power to seize, since by the treaty it had im-
posed a territorial limitation upon its own authority." 4
More utopian reasons for honoring a binding treaty were given
by Judge Bourquin in United States v. Ferris, when he stated that
"[a] decent respect for the opinions of mankind, national honor,
harmonious relations between nations, and avoidance of war, re-
quire that the contracts and law represented in treaties shall be
scrupulously observed." 8 5 Cases of a more recent vintage uphold
Judge Bourquin's sentiments."6 Not all treaties, however, bind a
court to follow its strictures as law.8 Rather, a court is obligated to
adhere to a treaty's stipulations only when the treaty is self-execut-
ing in nature or is given effect by congressional legislation.88
a. The Self-Executing Treaty Doctrine and the Executory
Treaty. Not all treaties addressing the issue of national sovereignty
will have an effect on a United States court's ability to prosecute an
extraterritorially apprehended fugitive. Rather, only those treaties
that are self-executing or contain an executory provision may bind
the United States when it prosecutes fugitives who have fled the
country.89
83. Id. at 121.
84. Id.
85. United States v. Ferris, 19 F.2d 925, 927 (S.D. Idaho 1927).
86. See United States v. Quemener, 789 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1986) (seizure of British
sail-boat transporting marijuana was allowed because the seizure did not violate a treaty
between the United States and Britain); Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d 1462, 1470
(llth Cir. 1989) (valid claim under the Warsaw Convention preempts the contrary state
law); Vorhees v. Fischer & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574, 575 (4th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff given a
reasonable opportunity to affect valid service in a manner complying with the Hague Con-
vention because a self-executing treaty is of equal dignity with acts of Congress); Muscogee
(Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (provisions of the Oklahoma
Indian Welfare Act granting tribes the right to organize courts repealed the previously en-
acted Curtis Act which proscribed such courts).
87. Cook, 288 U.S. at 120.
88. Id.
89. Fernandez v. Wilkerson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 796 (D. Kan. 1980), appeal decided
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A self-executing treaty can have full force and effect of law with-
out express legislative adoption if the language in the treaty ex-
presses that the treaty will become the law of the signatories.9"
When the issue is presented in litigation, the question of whether a
treaty is self-executing is a matter of interpretation for the courts.9 '
The parties' intent may be determined by the language of the
treaty, or, if the language is ambiguous, may be ascertained by the
circumstances surrounding the treaty's promulgation. The courts
may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the
negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the par-
ties.9" The court will then attempt to discern the intent of the par-
ties regarding the agreement, so as to carry out their manifest
purpose. 4
If the treaty is not self-executing, it may contain an executory
provision."B The executory provision is a stand-alone clause in the
treaty.96 The clause directs the legislatures of one or more of the
parties to adopt the treaty's stipulations as that nation's own law.
Even without a stand-alone executory provision, treaties with ex-
press language directing that the treaty be given effect by congres-
sional legislation have uniformly been declared as executory.97 The
United States adoption of the treaty's language is consummated
upon congressional ratification of the treaty.98
In summary, only treaties that are self-executing or that contain
654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
90. Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194; Cook, 288 U.S. at 119.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
154(1) (1965); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979). There are four
factors relevant to determining whether a treaty is self executing. They are: (1) the purposes
of the treaty and the objective of its creators; (2) the existence of objective procedures and
institutions appropriate for direct implementation; (3) the availability and feasibility of alter-
native enforcement methods; and (4) the immediate and long range social consequences of
self or non-self-execution. See People of Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d
90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975); Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F.
Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
92. Cook, 288 U.S. at 112; Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Postal, 589 F.2d at 876.
93. Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Sai-
pan, 502 F.2d at 97.
94. A. MCNAIR, LAW OF TREATIES 365 (1961); Postal, 589 F.2d at 876.
95. An executory provision is a special provision within a treaty which expressly pro-
vides that congressional legislation will be recommended and forthcoming so as to statutorily
bind the U.S. courts to the treaty's jurisdictional stipulations.
96. A stand-alone provision in a treaty is a written clause which is separate from the
main body of the agreement, but is nevertheless a part of the agreement, or attached to the
agreement document.
97. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 311-12 (1829).
98. Id.
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an executory provision have the force and effect of law. In a case
involving extraterritorial arrest, only these treaties can divest U.S.
courts of jurisdiction over the matter and/or the fugitive, if such is
the intent of the treaty.99
b. The United Nations Charter. The United Nations Charter is
an important document in determining the rights of nations con-
cerning international matters. 100 The Charter is a treaty and its rel-
evance is generally conditioned upon the asylum state joining with
the United States as a signatory to the treaty. 01 Commentators
have stated that violating the sovereignty of a member state, such
as conducting an extraterritorial arrest within the member's bor-
ders, is incompatible with the United Nations Charter.102 More-
over, all signatories to the United Nations Charter promise to re-
frain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state.'
While the United States is in fact a signatory to the treaty, U.S.
courts have held that the provisions of the United Nations Charter
are not self-executing. Furthermore, the Charter does not have an
executory clause. 04 Accordingly, U.S. courts are not bound by the
Constitution or common law precedent to adhere the Charter's
guidelines. Consequently, the Charter's importance is greatly di-
minished as a determinative factor in this Comment because the
courts are not required to relinquish jurisdiction over a fugitive ab-
ducted in violation of the Charter's tenets.
c. The Extradition Treaty. Another important treaty in matters
of extraterritorial apprehensions is the implicated country's extradi-
tion treaty. 0 5 The United States has extradition treaties with many
countries. 106 Nevertheless, it is well established that the existence of
99. Cook, 288 U.S. at 112; Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 610 (1927).
100. 4 Op. Off. Legal Couns. 543, 545 (1980).
101. When foreign nationals are seized in violation of a treaty, only the signatory na-
tions and not the individual citizens can protest the treaty. Lugan, 510 F.2d at 67.
102. Abramovsky & Eagle, U.S. Policy in Apprehending Alleged Offenders Abroad:
Adduction, or Irregular Rendition?, 57 OR. L. REV. 51, 63 (1977); Silving, In re Eichmann:
A Dilemma of Law and Morality, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 307 (1961).
103. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, T 4.
104. Id.
105. 4 Op. Off. Legal Couns. 543 (1980).
106. See Ker, 119 U.S. at 444; Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 206-208 (3rd Cir.
1975); United States v. Sobell, 244 F.2d at 524-25 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
873 (1957).
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an extradition agreement does not defeat the United State's juris-
diction over a fugitive apprehended outside the extradition mecha-
nism. 1"7 Essentially, jurisdiction is upheld because the purpose of
an extradition treaty is more closely tailored to the needs of the
signatory nations rather than the needs of an asylum-seeking fugi-
tive.1"8 In other words, the extradition laws are intended to benefit
the nation that wants to apprehend the fugitive, instead of aiding a
fugitive in his flight from the pursuing nation. The treaty regulates
asylum status and extradition by limiting the fugitive's right to asy-
lum, not by guaranteeing such a right. 10 Furthermore, a fugitive
lacks standing to raise the treaty as a basis for challenging the
court's jurisdiction because he is not a party to the treaty." 0 Gener-
ally, extradition treaties do not express that the United States will
yield jurisdiction over nationals who have committed crimes in this
country simply because they obtained refuge in the asylum state."'
In addition, the right of a sovereign state to voluntarily give a fugi-
tive asylum in that country is quite apart from a unilateral right of
the fugitive to demand asylum and remain in the state. 12 Extradi-
tion guidelines merely provide that one who is proven to be a crimi-
nal fleeing justice may, on proper demand of the fugitive's country
of citizenship and proceedings therein, be delivered to the country
where the crime was committed. 1 3
Therefore, the laws regulating asylum and extradition do not
"entitle" a fugitive to asylum in the country where he has fled."'
As a consequence, a fugitive's personal aspirations concerning asy-
lum status or his immunity from extradition are not determinative
in the extraterritorial arrest issue.
In conclusion, the existence of an extradition treaty does not pro-
vide a per se prohibition of employing alternative means to bring
wanted fugitives to justice, such as the extraterritorial arrest.
107. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988) (acting on a
complaint based upon an informant's tip, DEA agents flew to Guatemala and abducted
Zabaneh, a citizen of Belize, at the airport. He was strip-searched and detained and flown
back to Texas, where he was formally arrested. When Zabeneh argued that international
extradition treaties deprived the U.S. courts of jurisdiction, the court held that treaties are
contracts among nations, that neither Guatemala nor Belize protested Zabeneh's abduction
and removal to the United States, and therefore Zabeneh lacked standing to raise the trea-
ties as a basis for challenging the court's jurisdiction).
111. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444.
112. Id. at 442.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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Rather, the extradition treaty provides a method or system for the
conventional and orderly transfer or exchange of fugitives held in
one country and wanted by another country.
d. Unilateral Amendment of a Binding Treaty. There are meth-
ods by which the limiting language in a treaty may be circum-
vented. Employing one of these methods allows a treaty signatory
that does not wish to be bound by one or more of a treaty's stric-
tures to amend any undesirable language.
For instance, if a signatory is dissatisfied with the treaty, it may
present its complaint to the executive head of the other signatory's
government.115 Another effective method of circumvention is the
unilateral legislative modification, which withholds the execution of
one or more of the treaty's clauses.1 16 Similarly, a congressional
amendment to a treaty cannot be challenged on the grounds that it
violates customary international law.117 Congress remains free to
legislate with respect to extraterritorial conduct, and is subject only
to the limitations of the Constitution."" The treaty will be deemed
abrogated or modified by a later statute only if such purpose has
been clearly expressed by Congress. 19 Any doubt as to the con-
struction of the section should be deemed resolved by the consistent
departmental practice existing before its enactment. 120 Such modifi-
cations do not alter the effectiveness of the unamended portion of
the treaty. 2 ' Lastly, these modifications are not judicial matters;
rather, they are controlled by to the legislative and executive
branches of the government.12 2
Congress' motivation for making post-signatory modifications is
wholly immaterial. The duty of the courts is to construe and give
effect to the latest expression of the sovereign's will, as expressed by
either the treaty or Congress.1 23 Therefore, judicial interpretation
of a treaty is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its
enforcement, modification, or repeal.124 Finally, this ability to pre-
115. Whitney v. Robinson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
116. Id. at 194-95.
117. Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
118. U.S. v. Biermann, 678 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
119. Cook, 288 U.S. at 120.
120. Id.
121. Whitney, 124 U.S at 195.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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empt a prior and contradictory treaty applies to customary interna-
tional law as well. 125
One exception to Congress' ability to unilaterally amend interna-
tional agreements deals with peremptory norms. Peremptory norms
of international law, or jus cogens, enjoy the highest status within
international law and are absolutely binding upon the U.S. as a
matter of domestic law.'2 6 Examples of peremptory norms include
the prohibition of slavery, torture, genocide, and racial discrimina-
tion.' 27 Peremptory norms are recognized by the international com-
munity as a whole, and no derogation is permitted. 28 According to
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, any legislative mod-
ification of a treaty which violates a peremptory norm is void.' 29
Clearly, an extraterritorial arrest, in and of itself, is not an indig-
nity of a similar class as the examples of peremptory norms listed
above. Therefore, a unilateral legislative modification of a treaty to
permit an extraterritorial arrest would not violate a peremptory
norm of international law.
In conclusion, a self-executing or executory treaty may effec-
tively prevent the lawful performance of an extraterritorial arrest,
if that is the purpose of the document. Extradition treaties, while
providing for an orderly extradition of a signatory's fugitives, do
not prevent the return of the fugitives by means outside of the ex-
tradition mechanism. Congress may unilaterally amend any treaty
at any time, unless the modification would violate peremptory
norms of international law. This ability to amend a treaty gives the
United States great latitude in tailoring any binding treaty to con-
form to changes in policy such as the utilization of the extraterrito-
rial arrest in apprehending international drug traffickers and other
fugitives who have fled the country. 3 '
4. Authority of the United States Courts to Prosecute Fugitives
Apprehended in Violation of Customary International Law. De-
tractors of the non-consensual extraterritorial arrest argue that
even if the act does not violate the Constitution or a binding treaty,
125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987).
126. Reagan, 859 F.2d at 940.
127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (1987). Tel-oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
128. I. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 203-07 (2d ed.
1984).
129. Id.
130. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
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the intrusion on a raided country's sovereignty is a violation of cus-
tomary international law, and as such, the court should repudiate
jurisdiction over the fugitive. This section details customary inter-
national law as it pertains to the non-consensual extraterritorial ar-
rest issue. Both the political and domestic law aspects of customary
international law are discussed. Lastly, there is a discussion regard-
ing the potential for modification of customary international law by
an executive act.
"Customary international law" is the manifestation of an inter-
national custom that accepts a general practice among nations as
law. It is the result of a general and consistent practice that is fol-
lowed by nations from a sense of legal obligation.13' A state may
opt out of a customary international law during its formative stage
by refusing to consent to it.132 Once the practice has acquired the
status of law, the law is obligatory for all states that have not ob-
jected to it. 133
There is a widely held conviction or "custom" among nations
that no state shall prosecute or punish any person who has been
brought within its territory by measures in violation of international
law without first obtaining the consent of the state whose rights
have been violated.' In Lugan v. Gengler,35 the court plainly
stated that the abduction of a fugitive from another country, with-
out that country's consent, is indeed a violation of customary inter-
national law. 36 However, the court expressly reserved judgment as
to whether such a violation alone would require dismissal of an in-
dictment.3 7 Hence, the crux of this issue is whether a fugitive ap-
prehended via a non-consensual extraterritorial arrest, and in viola-
tion of customary international law, may be subjected to
prosecution by a United States court.
To the extent possible, U.S. courts must construe American law
so as to avoid violating general principles of international law.138
However, the concept of a sovereign enforcing its domestic laws,
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987).
132. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.) 1951 I.C.J. 116, 160-62 (Dec. 18).
133. Id.
134. Dickinson, Jurisdiction With Respect To Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Sopa. 439,
623-24 (1935).
135. United States ex rel. Lugan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975).
136. Id. at 68; see also FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636
F.2d 1300, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
137. Id.
138. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch), 64, 101-02 (1804);
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453-54 (11 th Cir. 1986); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987).
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although contrary to international law, is a fundamental aspect of
the international law's accommodation to principles of national sov-
ereignty.1 39 The Nuremburg tribunal articulated this sentiment in
United States v. Altstoetter,"'O when it stated:
[t]his universality and superiority of international law does not
necessarily imply universality of its enforcement .... The law is
universal, but such a state reserves unto itself the exclusive power
within its boundaries to apply or withhold sanctions. Thus, not-
withstanding the paramount authority of the substantive rules of
common international law, the doctrines of national sovereignty
have been preserved through the control of enforcement
machinery.""'
Hence, if the United States were considered to be absolutely bound
to enforce all customary international law without the possibility of
exception, our country's sovereignty would be in danger of abroga-
tion by international law. Thus, U.S. courts are obliged to give def-
erence to customary international law, but contrary international
laws do not control the courts as binding precedent.
a. Classifying the International Law Violation as a Matter for
Political Resolution. In the United States, there is a line of cases
that deal with the prosecution of individuals apprehended in viola-
tion of customary international law, regardless of the accomanying
formal international protest. These cases hold that the courts may
interdict or overrule the enforcement of the international law by
classifying the violation as an international and political matter
that would best be addressed by the executive branch of the govern-
ment, as distinguished from a domestic matter within a court's
jurisdiction. 42
For example, in Ex Parte Lopez, 43 the defendant was abducted
from Mexico by U.S. agents for violation of narcotics laws. During
the trial in Texas, the government of Mexico intervened and de-
manded that the accused be delivered into its custody because the
abduction was in violation of international agreements between the
two governments. The court dismissed the intervention, holding
139. Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1427 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
140. Id. at 1427 (citing United States v. Altstoetter) (The "Justice case") III Trials of
War Criminals, U.S. Gov't Printing Off., Wash. D.C. (1951)).
141. Id.
142. See generally Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1455; The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677
(1900); and Dickinson, supra note 134, at 628.
143. Ex parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Tex. 1934).
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that while the government of Mexico raises a serious complaint,
that being a violation of its sovereignty, the district court had no
jurisdiction over the complaint."4 Rather, Mexico's complaint
should be presented to the Executive Department of the United
States. " 5 The court held that it indeed had jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate the alleged criminal violation.
In State v. Brewster, a Canadian was forcibly taken against his
will from Canada to the United States for prosecution.4 The de-
fendant moved for dismissal of the indictment because of the extra-
territorial nature of the abduction. The court responded:
[i]t becomes immaterial, whether the prisoner was brought out of
Canada with the assent of the authorities of that country or not.
If there were anything improper in the transaction, it was not that
the prisoner was entitled to the protection on his own account.
The illegality, if any, consists in the violation of the sovereignty of
an independent nation. If that Nation complains, it is a matter
which concerns the political relations of the two countries, and in
that aspect, is a subject not within the constitutional powers of
this court."'
The court upheld jurisdiction over the defendant.
In The Ship Richmond v. United States,48 the United States
Supreme Court held that seizing a vessel within the territorial juris-
diction of a foreign power is certainly an offense against that
power.' 4 9 Yet, the Court held that "[t]his court can take no cogni-
zance of it; . . . the law does not connect that trespass, if it be one,
with the subsequent seizure by the civil authority, under the process
of the district court, so as to annul the proceedings of that court
against the vessel."' 50 The jurisdiction of the court was upheld.' 5'
The Supreme Court, in Cook v. United States, 52 distinguished
the violation of a binding treaty from a violation of customary in-
ternational law. The Cook Court referred to The Ship Richmond'53
and The Merino'54 where the forfeitures of vessels seized in viola-
144. Id. at 343.
145. Id.
146. State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118 (1835).
147. Id. at 121-22.
148. The Ship Richmond v. United States, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102 (1815).
149. Id. at 103.
150. Id.
151. The Court reiterated this policy of separating political issues from judicial issues
nine years later in The Merino, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 391, 398-401 (1824).
152. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1932).
153. The Ship Richmond, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102.
154. The Merino, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 391.
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tion of international law were upheld.
There, the vessels seized were of American registry; and the
seizures did not violate any treaty, but were merely violations of
the law of nations because made within the territory of another
sovereign. In those actions it was held that the illegality of the
seizures did not affect the venue of the action or the process of the
court. Here, the objection is more fundamental.155
In United States v. Blanco,15 Blanco, a Colombian national, was
arrested in California ten years after her indictment for drug traf-
ficking was filed. Federal agents had Blanco under surveillance
throughout the ten year period, but decided not to arrest her for a
variety of reasons. 157 Blanco claimed this delay denied her right to
a speedy trial under the sixth amendment. Blanco argued, among
other things, that the U.S. had an affirmative duty to seize her
while she was in Colombia. The agent had not arrested Blanco
there because Colombia had a policy of refusing to extradite its
citizens to the United States, and Colombia had not consented to
Blanco's seizure. In response, the Second Circuit stated that
"[w]hile the government's illegal seizure of a defendant in another
country does not, standing alone, automatically deprive the courts
of jurisdiction over the defendant . . . it surely does not follow that
the government had a duty to make such a seizure. '1 a8 This pas-
sage could be interpreted to state affirmatively that a non-consen-
sual extraterritorial arrest in violation of customary international
law, without more, does not divest the court of jurisdiction over the
abducted fugitive.
In conclusion, the court may prosecute the extraterritorially ap-
prehended fugitive by classifying the international law violation as
a matter for political resolution, as distinguished from a domestic
matter within its jurisdiction. By classifying the violation of inter-
national law as a matter outside its purview, the court may then
disregard the violation as irrelevant to the instant proceeding. Thus,
several older cases, as well as the recent dicta of the judiciary, indi-
cate that a violation of customary international law does not neces-
155. The Ship Richmond, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 122.
156. United States v. Blanco, 861 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1988).
157. Id. at 778-779. The reasons that Blanco was not arrested earlier include: (1)
Blanco lived a portion of the time in Colombia which has a policy of not extraditing its
citizens; (2) while Blanco was in America, Government agents were afraid of endangering
the life of an informant; and (3) the agent feared Blanco's arrest would jeopardize an investi-
gation of Blanco's sons.
158. Id. at 779.
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sarily divest a United States court of jurisdiction over the domestic
issues presented in the case.
b. Overriding Customary International Law with the Executive
Act. Classifying the international law violation as a political matter
is not the sole theory upon which a United States court may prose-
cute a person apprehended in violation of international law. Rather,
customary international law is controlling only "where there is no
treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial de-
cision.1"159 Thus, the "executive act" is another theory under which
the courts may prosecute those apprehended in violation of interna-
tional law.
In 1986, the Eleventh Circuit held that an executive act by the
Attorney General may, in certain circumstances, overrule contrary
international law."' In Garcia-Mir, the plaintiff, a Cuban Mariel
refugee, was arbitrarily detained as a result of an order by the At-
torney General. The plaintiff argued that the court should grant an
order releasing him from custody, claiming that his current deten-
tion was unlawful. In his argument, the plaintiff stated that the
principles of customary international law forbade the prolonged ar-
bitrary detention of aliens. Furthermore, the plaintiff argued, there
had not been an affirmative legislative grant of authority to detain,
nor was there a controlling executive act which might override the
international law violation.
In its analysis, the court noted that the governing deportation
statute did not restrict the power of the Attorney General to detain
aliens indefinitely. The court then stated:
[t]he President, "acting within his constitutional authority, may
have the power under the Constitution to act in ways that consti-
tute violations of international law by the United States." The
Constitution provides for the creation of executive departments,
and the power of the President to delegate his authority to those
departments to act on his behalf is unquestioned .... [T]he power
of the President to disregard international law in the service of
domestic needs is reaffirmed. Thus we hold that the executive acts
here evident constitute a sufficient basis for ... finding that inter-
national law does not control. 6 '
The court then stated: "[t]his reflects the obligation of the courts to
159. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
160. Gareia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1446.
161. Id. at 1454-55.
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avoid any ruling that would 'inhibit the flexibility of the political
branches of government to respond to changing world conditions...
" ,,162 The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to parole
revocation hearings on the basis of international law since any
rights that previously existed had been extinguished by the Attor-
ney General, acting on behalf of the President. 1 3
Just as Congress did not restrict the Attorney General from arbi-
trarily detaining aliens, Congress has not restricted the power of
the Attorney General to authorize the extraterritorial arrest.164 The
FBI may conduct investigations as may be directed by the Attorney
General. 6 15 Thus, it may be argued, an order by the Attorney Gen-
eral that authorizes the extraterritorial arrest would constitute an
executive act. This executive act would control any contrary inter-
national laws, and facilitate the prosecution of the arrested
individual.
In conclusion, a series of older cases expressly state that arrests
made in violation of customary international law are political mat-
ters, and as such, the violations are not within the purview of the
domestic courts. More recently, a federal court stated in dicta that
international law violations, without more, may not divest the court
of jurisdiction. Finally, customary international law can be inter-
dicted or overruled by an executive act of the President or the At-
torney General.
III. PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATION
As detailed above, the United States, as a self-determined and
sovereign country, has claimed the right to prosecute international
fugitives such as drug traffickers within its courts. While this
"right" should prove advantageous in President Bush's war on
drugs, the ability to prosecute those apprehended does not address
the second key issue of the extraterritorial arrest. That is, whether
there is a remedy for the political agitation that inevitably follows a
non-consensual extraterritorial arrest. This Comment sets forth
proposals for both a short term political solution and a long term
international legal solution.
162. Id. at 1455; see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
163. Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1454.
164. See 28 U.S.C. § 533(c) (Supp. 1990).
165. Id.
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A. A Political Remedy
Commentators agree that the sovereign nation whose laws have
been violated by another sovereign nation is entitled to relief.' 6
However, the courts are not in a position to adjudicate such a viola-
tion. Courts are merely an arm of a nation, and they maintain a
jurisdiction that can rise no higher than the jurisdiction of the na-
tion itself.'6 7 Thus, a domestic court is not the proper forum for an
international political conflict of this nature."6 8 On the contrary,
these international disputes require an international political solu-
tion because the violation is essentially political in nature."6 9
This political remedy regarding the infringement on sovereignty
issue would call for the trespassing nation paying reparations in the
form of money damages to the nation whose sovereignty has been
violated. The amount of the settlement could be determined by a
neutral third party such as the United Nations. This view is by no
means a novel one. The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States sets forth in pertinent part that "if a
state's law enforcement officials exercise their functions in the terri-
tory of another state without the latter's consent, that state is enti-
tled to protest and, in appropriate cases, to receive reparations from
the offending state."' 70
In 1960, Israeli nationals abducted a fugitive from Argentina
and Argentina formally protested the act. The United Nations re-
quested that the Government of Israel make "appropriate repara-
tions" in accordance with the United Nations Charter and interna-
tional law.' 71 A U.N. demand that the Israelis return the fugitive to
Argentina was conspicuously absent from the resolution, as was a
demand to punish the fugitive's captors. It is possible that the
United Nations was proposing a money settlement from the Israelis
in favor of Argentina for their obvious violation of Argentina's sov-
ereignty.' 72 Israel refused to admit any wrongdoing. Instead, Israel
responded with a conditional apology stating that if any laws were
broken, they wished to express their regrets.'
166. Dickinson, supra note 134, at 628.
167. Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Search or Arrest in Violation of International
Law, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 233 (1934).
168. Id.
169. Dickinson, supra note 134, at 628.
170. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 432 (1987).
171. Silving, supra note 102, at 312-15.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 318.
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In conclusion, the invasion of sovereignty issue may best be rem-
edied by a monetary settlement that is negotiated and arbitrated
within the existing international political framework of the United
Nations. The concept of monetary reparations has been indirectly
proposed by the U.N. in previous disputes. Moreover, this solution
has been endorsed in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law.
B. A Proposal for International Jurisdiction over Drug
Traffickers
International law recognizes universal jurisdiction over certain
heinous offenses. This "universality principle" of jurisdiction is
based upon the assumption that some crimes are so universally con-
demned that the perpetrators are enemies of all the world's peo-
ple.1 74 As defined by Section 404 of The Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Tentative Draft
No. 5 (1984): "A state may exercise jurisdiction to define and pun-
ish certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of
universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hi-jack-
ing of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps terrorism....1,,71
Any nation which has custody of the perpetrators may punish them
according to its law applicable to such offenses."71 This principle is
a departure from the general rule that the character of an act as
lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the
country where the act is done.177 Universal jurisdiction found ac-
ceptance in the aftermath of World War II, when numerous de-
fendants were convicted of "war crimes" and "crimes against hu-
manity." The offenses which were tried at Nuremburg were, for the
most part, committed outside the territories of the four Allies who
prosecuted these criminals. 178 The alleged criminals were prose-
cuted in several forums and in a number of instances the Allies
exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction over the accused. 79 The de-
fendants objected to the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction,
but these objections were uniformly rejected. 8 '
174. Demijanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
178. See In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 556-57 (C.D. Ohio 1985).
The four Allies were Great Britain, France, the United States, and Russia.
179. Id. at 556.
180. Id. at 557.
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The United States has been forced to consider drastic measures
such as the non-consensual extraterritorial arrest because the coun-
try is not winning its "war on drugs." A potential international so-
lution is to elevate the disdain for international drug traffickers to
the level of a heinous offense, thus bringing the traffickers within
the purview of "universal jurisdiction."
The crime of drug trafficking has consequences similar to geno-
cide, a crime that has traditionally justified the imposition of uni-
versal jurisdiction. Genocide has been defined as "killing" and
"causing serious bodily harm committed with the intent to destroy"
a nation, or a specific race of people.181 Likewise, no one would
dispute the fact that drug traffickers are responsible in whole or in
part for killing and causing serious bodily harm to millions world-
wide. Furthermore, the traffickers have apparently targeted a spe-
cific race of people, American minorities, in the perpetration of
their crimes. Thus, international drug trafficking could be included
as a heinous crime worthy of universal jurisdiction.
An international tribunal could be established that would exert
universal jurisdiction over known drug traffickers. Participating
countries would then enjoy extraterritorial jurisdiction to appre-
hend and prosecute these criminals. A check and balance on this
wholesale grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction would be an exacting
arrest warrant procedure, based upon the fourth amendment of the
United States Constitution. The lawfulness of the arrest of the sus-
pect would be dependant upon the issuance of a warrant. The par-
ticipating countries' law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI,
could be deputized by the tribunal to carry out customary law en-
forcement duties such as investigation, apprehension, and transpor-
tation of the traffickers. The burden of incarcerating those con-
victed by the tribunal could be distributed pro rata among the
participating countries. Similarly, the tribunal could find funding
and resources throughout the world community.
While this solution is merely hypothetical, the Nuremburg trials
of the past have demonstrated the viability of this approach to ap-
prehend and prosecute international criminals. While there would
inevitably be difficulties in coordinating such a tribunal, perhaps
now is the time to begin entertaining such ideas.
181. Id. at 557-58.
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V. CONCLUSION
The United States is involved in a "war on drugs" with interna-
tional drug traffickers. The FBI and the courts are central to the
government's ability to win this war because these institutions are
responsible for the apprehension and prosecution of the drug traf-
fickers. In a bid to bolster the FBI's capability in this war, the Bush
Administration has recently considered authorizing the FBI to per-
form extraterritorial arrests and override customary or other inter-
national law in doing so. These extraterritorially apprehended fugi-
tives could be prosecuted within constitutional guidelines.
The Bush administration's position in this matter is not a novel
one. However, the carrying out of these arrests is destined to create
international unrest. This unrest will not divest the United States of
jurisdiction over the matter, but the prosecution of the individual
would surely offend the international community because of the
sovereignty infringement issues.
A policy of permitting the FBI to make wholesale non-consensual
extraterritorial arrests can only be rationally implemented if ac-
companied by a political remedy for the violations of the raided
nation's sovereignty. One such solution is the paying of reparations
to the country. These monetary settlements could be negotiated and
arbitrated by a neutral third party such as the United Nations. A
more radical approach would consist of elevating the perpetration
of international drug trafficking to the level of a heinous crime.
Heinous crimes are currently subject to universal jurisdiction. Once
labeled as a heinous crime, participating nations could, under the
auspices of an international tribunal, carry out the apprehension,
prosecution, and punishment of international drug traffickers.
Michael R. Pontoni
1990]
29
Pontoni: Authority of the United States to Extraterritorially Apprehend an
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1990
30
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 1 [1990], Art. 11
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol21/iss1/11
